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INTRODUCTION

The growth of computer centers into regional, national, and international information networks is gaining momentum. The function and capabilities of these
networks obviously vary. Some serve as remote batch processing centers; others
operate as time-shared centers; many act as data collection and dissemination centers;
a few distribute computer power in a manner not unlike the load-sharing of electrical
energy. Whether called remote access information systems, teleprocessing, or computer utility services, the fact remains that computer and communication facilities
are finding themselves increasingly interdependent-an interdependence that carries
with it several questions that have surfaced as issues of public policy.
The purpose of this paper is to explore these issues (I) by identifying the growth
of remote computer-based services, (2) by examining the growing interface between
computers and communications, and (3) by outlining the diversification of both computer and communication firms into markets that are directly competitive. The policy
problems inherent in the interface and diversification issue go to the structural core
of the communications common carrier industry. They have been examined not
only by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) but by a Presidential Task
Force on Communications Policy as well.
I
Ti

GRowTH

OF REMOTE

COMPUTER-BASED SERVICES

As a fairly recent phenomenon the growth of remote computer-based services

focuses upon the concept of computer time-sharing. Time-sharing permits several
users to exploit simultaneously a central computer facility, thus representing a break
from conventional or batch processing methods of computer operation. Each subscriber may use a central computer facility for conversational, debugging, or remote
batch processing, and each is under the impression that he alone has access to the
-computer's logic and memory capability.
The key to time-sharing as well as other on-line data service is the term "remote."
The user no longer needs to be located adjacent to the computer site, but can gain
access to the computer via a remote terminal attached to telephone or telegraph lines.
The development of time-sharing has led many to predict an upsurge in computer
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usage, particularly as the sharing of overhead costs translates into lower prices. The
expectation is that remote teleprocessing will make digital information services
available to the school, the home, the laboratory, and the firm on a fairly common
basis.
Certainly the growth projections of time-sharing and other computer services are
impressive. From a revenue base of some $7o million in 1968, the commercial timesharing market is expected to exceed $I billion by 1973; by the mid-197os some
seventy-five per cent of the nation's computer systems are expected to possess timesharing capability; by the same time period some fifty per cent of all computer
systems will be tied to the nation's communication lines. Finally, the communication carriers expect their nonvoice traffic to exceed their voice traffic within the next
decade.' Indeed, there is some indication that we are witnesses not merely to a new
service but to the growth of a unique industry, separate and apart from either the
communications or the computer industry as we know them today.
II
THE INTE"FACE Issux

Given the growth of time-sharing and given the rise in remote computer-based
services, it is perhaps inevitable that a new class of user is becoming an important
segment of the carriers' demand function. These users, differing from the residential
telephone subscriber, are knowledgeable, possess considerable communications expertise, and are, above all, articulate. Moreover, as communications expenses become
an increased proportion of systems costs, they tend to set the limit to market
penetration. The result has seen communication practices and customs subject to an
unprecedented reappraisal and review. The fact that carrier practices are embodied
as filed tariffs, dating back in some cases fifty years, is apparently of little consequence.
Questioning and reappraisal are the order of the day.
A. The Foreign Attachment Tariff
A prime example of a carrier practice under fire is the rule that prohibits customer equipment from being attached to the public telephone network-a rule that
extends to the interconnection of private microwave or other user communication
facilities. These tariffs, known as the foreign attachment and the interconnection
tariffs respectively, have been defended on several grounds. The carriers submit
that control and ownership of equipment cannot be separated from their responsibility
of operating a nationwide telephone system; that ownership is required to insure
innovation of new products and maintenance of existing switching and terminal
I See Whole New Market, FoRBEs, July I, 1969, at 43; Osterman, A Study in Commercial Time
Sharing, AUERAC, Dec. I, 1968, at A-i; Irwin, The Computer Utility, DATAmATION, Nov. x966, at
22. See also Regulatory Decisions Affecting the Data Processing Community: The Federal Communications Commission, in PROCEEDINGS Or INTERNATIONAL DATA PROCESSING MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION 344
(June x968).
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hardware; and that control of equipment is essential to protect the quality of the
telephone switched network.
Critics of the foreign attachment tariff assert that the carriers are effecting a tie-in
between lines and equipment, that such a tie-in rests essentially on rate base economics
alone, and that the extension of a regulated monopoly into the hardware or terminal
market, given the carriers' ownership of manufacturing affiliates, is at best questionable and at worst anticompetitive.
The validity of these arguments aside, the point remains that established carrier
procedures have now been challenged by a new user class-a class seeking the advantages of equipment choice, price, and performance, as well as the option to own
related communication apparatus.
B. Public Policy
As more and more remote terminals use telephone lines to tie into central
computer facilities, the interface issue assumes a significance all its own. Indeed,
the carriers' foreign attachment and interconnection tariff has erupted in two FCC
proceedings, the Computer Inquiry2 and the Carterphonecase,' and has merited the
attention of a Presidential Task Force on Communications Policy.
Launched in 1966, the FCC Computer Inquiry found both suppliers and users
calling for a re-evaluation of carrier tariffs banning customer-owned equipment.
Some respondents asked that the tariff be banned outright; others recommended
that the carrier publish technical performance standards, on the premise that
specifications would prevent customer-owned devices from degrading the quality of
the telephone network. What users and suppliers were both seeking was a "plug"
or "socket" concept that would enable a host of information appliances to have access
to the switched telephone network without harming that network.
About a year later, the FCC Computer Inquiry was superseded by the Carterphone case. This case began when the Bell System objected to a coupling device-the
Carterphone device-that permitted a private mobile system to tie into the toll
telephone network. When the case reached the Commission, after first appearing in
the courts, it was clear that the Carterphone device constituted a direct violation
of American Telephone and Telegraph Company's (AT&T) foreign attachment and
interconnection tariff. The dispute was thus clearly joined.
In this decision the FCC ruled that not only should the Carterphone device be
allowed on the switched telephone network but implied that it had never sanctioned
the tariff in the first place. This ruling, perhaps as startling to the computer industry as it was disappointing to the carriers, prompted AT&T to file several rounds
2
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Services and Facilities, 7 F.C.C.2d xi (1966) [hereinafter cited as FCC Computer Inquiry].
'Use of the Carterphone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, X3 F.C.C.2d 42o, afl'd on rehearing, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968). For an excellent discussion of the foreign attachment tariff, see S.
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of tariffs permitting the connection of user-owned acoustic couplers and PBX systems
as well as extending the interconnection privileges to private microwave.
Viewed from the carriers' perspective these changes were unprecedented. Nevertheless, these new filings remain beset by controversy. Some respondents are disappointed that the carriers have not published technical standards; others argue
that the carrier was not justified in excluding "network control of signalling devices"
-the telephone dialing unit-from the new tariff; and the Justice Department has
asserted that the burden of proof on banning subscriber equipment should rest with
the carrier rather than with the user.4 After several attempts to negotiate these differences through informal meetings and conferences, the FCC has turned to the National
Academy of Sciences for counsel and guidance.
III
THE

DIVERSIFICATION ISSUE

A second policy question focuses on market diversification. This question encompasses several intriguing issues: May private firms employ computers for the
storing and forwarding of record messages? May commercial firms render both
computer switching and data processing service simultaneously? And may the common carriers as regulated entities diversify into remote computer-based service? Our
discussion will begin by considering the diversification efforts of both computer firms
and the common carriers.
A. EDP to Communications
It is somewhat rare for firms to engage computers to perform a pure switching
function. In most cases computers route record messages as well as process datathus exploiting a dual communication/computer capability. While corporate in-house
use of such services is common, the packaging of both communications and data
processing as a commercial service is controversial. On this issue, communication
common carriers have expressed some apprehension that firms engaged in routing
of messages border on "third-party switching" and hence touch the essence of a
regulated communication service. The carriers assert that such switching be confined
to regulated utilities alone, and that entry by nonregulated firms into a regulated
activity erodes the very concept of a public utility offering.
By contrast, the computer industry suggests that advances in computer technology
make the so-called communications/data marriage inevitable, that the public needs
and demands such services, and that to deny the data-processing industry an opportunity to both route and process data is tantamount to ruling that a computer can
be programmed to add but not to subtract
'See D. Baker, "Computers, Communication and Competition," a paper presented to a symposium on
The Computer Utility: Implications for Higher Education, University of New Hampshire, May 5, 1969.
'Simonson, Communication Needs of Remotely Accessed Computers, in AMERucAN FEDERATION OF
INFORIATION PROCESSING SOCIETIES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FALL JOINT COMPUTER CONFERENCE (1967).
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A recent dispute between the Bunker-Ramo Corporation and the communication
carriers makes this quarrel more than academic. Bunker-Ramo sold a stock market
information service that utilized a central computer feeding stock quotations over
the telephone lines. In so doing the firm leased telephone lines together with its
data processing services, selling both as a package to its subscribers in the brokerage
industry. Subscribers in turn queried the computer from remote terminal sets. Put
in jargon of the industry, Bunker-Ramo sold a computerized information service on
a remote access or real-time basis.
A problem of definition and diversification erupted when Bunker-Ramo attempted
to introduce a new service that grafted computer message routing to its information
data base. The carriers regarded this activity as competitive with their own teletype
services, contending that the element of communications was sufficient to classify
that activity as limited to regulated entities alone.6 By refusing to lease lines until
the Bunker-Ramo service was altered (the routing of administrative data was elim7
inated), the carriers forced Bunker-Ramo to abandon its new service.
A not unrelated subset to the hybrid computer/communications services is the
growth of facsimile transmission. Here, private users lease dedicated lines, drop
facsimile terminals at various locations, and in turn pick up and deliver documents
from facsimile service to the general public. In this particular case, Western Union
has asserted that such activity qualifies the service as a common carrier activity subject
to the Communications Act of 1934. s Some facsimile firms have agreed with this
interpretation, while others have denied it.' The point remains that the growth
and expansion of remote teleprocessing services-data or graphic-carries with it the
question as to whether such services are limited to firms possessing licenses of public
convenience and necessity.
B. Communications to EDP
The movement of communication carriers into data processing services represents
the inverse side of the diversification issue. This side also poses several questions:
What is the vehicle for carrier diversification into data processing? Which segment
of hybrid communication/EDP services should be tariffed? Should carrier participation in remote teleprocessing be permitted in the first place?
'Letter from Bunker-Ramo Co. to the FCC, March 12, x965. See also letter from Western Union
Tel. Co. to the FCC, regarding computer lease and service arrangements, March x4, x966.
'For a more detailed discussion, see Irwin, Time-Shared Information Systems: Market Entry in
Search of Policy, in PROCEEDINoS OF THE FA.L JOINr CoMPUrER CONFERENCE, supra note 5, at 513;
Smith, The Interdependence of Computer and Communications Services and Facilities: A Question of
Federal Regulation, 117 U. PA. L. Ray. 829, 847-53 (1969).
s 35 TELcommuNicATIONs RaP., May ig, 1969, at 23-25. See also Getting Mail by Phone, BUSINESS
WEEK, Sept. 28, 1968, at 158; FCC Set to Control Facsimile Companies, ELEc'raoNIC Naws, May 5,

1969, at 2.
9 See His First Million in Sight, BUSINESS WEEsK, May 24, 1969, at 94.
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Although the carriers possess several alternatives, it is convenient to classify their
diversification efforts as horizontal or vertical. The horizontal approach occurs when
a carrier, as a carrier, offers a remote teleprocessing service to the public either on a
tariffed or nontariffed basis. Presumably the latter is the approach employed by two
international record carriers--offering both processing and switching to subscribers on
a contract basis. In the domestic market, an abortive merger and now a joint venture
by Western Union and Computer Utilities Inc. also fits this category.
Moreover, a recent Western Union tariff, SICOM and INFOCOM, borders very
close to the horizontal approach.' 0 SICOM consists of shared computers and lines
leased to subscribers in the stock market industry; INFOCOM is a generalized version
of sharing to all private leased customers. Some data processing firms have been
apprehensive that such a tariff was indeed a prelude to the telegraph company's move
into remote data processing services-an apprehension put to the FCC.
When considering the tariffability of SICOM, the Federal Communications Commission had to dispose of a threshold question-namely, was Western Union offering
data processing or was it offering communications? From the record, the Commission concluded that SICOM constituted a legitimate communications activity.
Nevertheless, the FCC, in commenting on the possibility that data processing might
sometime be added to Western Union's services, cautioned:
We believe that substantial and different questions would be raised with respect
to the propriety of the tariff if there should be any broadening of the SICOM
offering by the addition of a fourth computer or any other means whereby W.U.
would perform or offer to perform non-communications data processing as a part
of the package SICOM Service. If this should occur, the tariff may be subject
to rejection and, in that event, we would expect to take such corrective action as
may be deemed necessary, either upon our own motion or upon complaint.1"
A subset to the horizontal approach may occur when a carrier takes the last step,
namely files a tariff for a remote teleprocessing service on the assumption that such
services are genuinely regulated in nature. To the extent no tariff has yet been filed,
this issue, or perhaps more accurately this confrontation, has been postponed. If such
a tariff is filed and accepted by the FCC, that acceptance serves as a precedent for
other carriers including AT&T. At the present time the Bell System's participation
is conditioned by an antitrust consent decree; and Bell has announced that it does
not intend to engage in teleprocessing services.'"
Firms in the computer industry are less than excited with horizontal diversification. Most caution that if the carriers offer remote teleprocessing such diversification
should be premised as a contract or nonregulated service, adding the codicil that
regulatory bodies must ensure adequate accounting safeguards between the carriers'
regulated and nonregulated markets.
10

Western Union Tel. Co. Tariff, FCC No. 251, Applicable to SICOM Service, i i F.C.C.2d 1 (1968).
"I1d. at para. 46.
12 Irwin, The Computer Utility: Competition or Regulation?, 76 YALE L.J. 1299 (1967).
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The other diversification route is for carriers to establish data processing affiliates,
separate and apart from their communications parent. Both the General Telephone
and Electronics Corporation and the United Utilities System have taken this route.'"
Presumably, such affiliates reside beyond the pale of direct regulation; and presumably
the vertical approach resolves any problems, anticompetitive, or regulatory.
Both approaches, horizontal and vertical, are not without their hazards. In the
former case carriers are selling services derived from a common plant to different
customers. Perhaps modern day accounting techniques make this a false issue, but
assigning specific costs to specific services lends itself neither to precision nor agreement and can border on the arbitrary--even when all costs are confined to regulated
services. Joint cost separation, in short, is one of the frustrating burdens of regulation. And if the computer industry sanctions horizontal diversifications by the
carriers, they may find themselves literally asking the FCC to assume the burden
of cost separation between regulated and nonregulated services as a means of ensuring fair and equitable competitive conditions.
The horizontal approaches touch a second problem. Carriers may possess competitive advantages in being able to sell data processing and communications as a
total package offering. The computer or data processing industry on the other hand
may find itself restricted to selling only the data processing segment with subscribers
necessarily turning to the carriers for the remaining segment, transmission lines.
Finally, the computer industry may be placed at a competitive disadvantage
when it leases communication lines from firms with whom they actually compete
in the marketplace. This is the issue of internal line discounts, and it exists within
the computer industry as well as the carrier industry. Undoubtedly regulatory authorides would be under pressure to ensure that no price discrimination takes place when
carriers sell lines to themselves or to their customers.
The vertical approach is not necessarily a neat way out of the dilemma cited above.
The fact remains that the carriers are not required to purchase their equipment,
supplies, or services on a formalized competitive basis. Data affiliates may sell
service to captive telephone carriers who in turn post the cost as operating expenses.
Under public utility accounting, regulated utilities are entitled to recover this
expense from subscriber revenues. The problem here is that it is not inconceivable
that carrier affiliates may, through an insulated market-namely the affiliate's parent
-diversify into competitive or nonregulated markets. Perhaps for this reason the
Department of Justice recommended that if carriers form data processing subsidiaries,
4
transactions between subsidiary and regulated parent should be banned.1
C. Public Policy
The current status of any policy attending carrier diversification remains un" Poindexter, The New Growth at GT&E, DuN's REv., Nov. 1967, at
General Tel. & Elec. Corp., FCC Computer Inquiry.
" Response of the Department of Justice, FCC Computer Inquiry.
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resolved. The FCC farmed out the responses to its computer inquiry to the Stanford
Research Institute."5 That report was, to be charitable, somewhat ambivalent. On
one side, SRI suggested that the economies of scale of carrier-owned computers
might justify market-diversification into teleprocessing. On the other hand, the report
took note of the competitive and innovative environment of the computer teleprocessing industry. Yet the report concluded that the Commission should consider
postponing any decision and rely instead on the threat of treble damage suits as a
short-term arbiter between regulated and nonregulated firms.
To the extent that the President's Task Force on Communications Policy took
note of some of the salient economic characteristics of firms in the teleprocessing
business, its recommendations were more direct.' The report observed that remote
computer services did not presently exhibit characteristics justifying comprehensive
public utility regulation, and it found no convincing case for extending regulation
to computer store and forward services.
Although these conclusions were welcomed by the data processing industry,
the report is nevertheless not entirely free from ambiguity. Part of the problem
is the proverbial search for a viable solution to Western Union's financial plight.
The report observed that Western Union should be permitted to offer teleprocessing
under the assumption that its record message service-the telegram-was hardly in
a position to subsidize market entry.' 7 Perhaps this observation is valid, but the
report apparently did not delve into the precedent value of that decision as it bears
on other carriers, not to mention the issue of policy consistency.
The question then of whether carriers, telephone or telegraph, are to be permitted
to move into nonregulated markets thus remains unanswered. Perhaps postponement
of this question is, as the SRI report implies, the best of all possible worlds. Yet
the line between postponement and proscrastination is very thin. Delaying decisions
on an admittedly tough and complex question increases the risk that corporate action
rather than policy discretion will structure not only a new market but a new industry as well. The stakes are indeed high.
CONCLUSION

Both the interface and diversification questions have been treated as separate and
unrelated issues. A second reading suggests a closer affinity-namely, the common
theme of market entry. Recent modifications in the foreign attachment tariff, despite
their controversial nature, do confer on the data subscriber an additional option or
choice. Equipment ownership now means that the user may buy directly from a noncarrier equipment supplier on the open market. Stated differently, the nonintegrated
I' D. DUNN ET AL., STANFORD REsEARcH INSnTUTE RESEARCH REPORT PREPARED FOR THE FEDERAL
COMUNICAMONS CO
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or independent supplier has been given greater access to a new market-the data
consumer.

Perhaps this step will stimulate pressure to extend that option to the operating
telephone carriers themselves despite their affiliation with equipment manufacturers.
Certainly computer firms supplying an array of digital switching equipment, concentrators, teleprinters, display units, modems, and the like, are finding themselves
in the role of independent suppliers attempting to crack a closed, verticallyintegrated market 18 The proliferation of competitive substitutes thus gives the
computer industry more than passing interest in the structure and procurement
practices of the common carriers.'
It is entirely possible that public policy will find itself coming full circle by
addressing itself once again to the structure of the communication carrier industry
as that structure bears on conduct and performance. In a very real sense, the questions of interface and diversification have subjected public policy to a profound
reappraisal-a re-examination triggered by the interdependence of computers and communications that over the next decade will grow rather than recede.
"s GE Introduces a Data Network, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1969, at 65, col. 5; GE Steps on Teletype's
Toes, BUSiNESS WEEK, April 5, 1969, at 52; IBM Phone Calls Europe, BusINEss WEEK, April xg, x969, at
39. 1
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